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Yoga and Indian Thought: The Theory of Soul

by Surendranath Dasgupta, from Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought (1930)

Summary: Chapter V of Dasgupta’s study of Yoga against the background of other Indian systems. He opens with the Carvakas and Buddhists, who deny a permanent soul, and reviews the criticisms the Nyaya and the other systems make of them. He then sets out the differing views of the self held by the schools that accept it, among them Ramanuja, who holds that the self is a non-material principle of bliss. Finally he describes the Samkhya-Yoga soul, the Purusha, as pure intelligence without self-consciousness in the ordinary sense, and the reasons for holding that there are many such selves and not one.

The Carvakas and Buddhists do not believe in the existence of any permanent soul or self. All the other systems of Indian Philosophy however believe in its existence, but differ as to ita nature and relations with conscious experience.

To understand properly the peculiarities of the Samkhya-Yoga theory of soul, it will be to our advantage to bear in mind the criticism that all the Hindu systems make in common, of the Carvakas and the Buddhists, and then pass in review the peculiarities of the soul-doctrine in important systems. To do this I shall first examine how the Carvakas and the Buddhists try to do away with the theory of a permanent soul in the light of the criticisms offered against them by Nyaya. The peculiarities of the soul-doctrine of Nyaya, the two schools of Mimamsa and Vedanta will then be compared and contrasted, so that we may attain a position from which it will be possible to form a correct estimate of the Samkhya-Yoga theory of soul, as it is in itself and in relation to other Indian doctrines.

The Lokayata school of Carvakas asserts that the body is endowed with intelligence and there is no separate soul; life and intelligence are only by-products of the transformations of matter at a certain stage as they appear in the body of an organic being just as molasses can in certain forms cause intoxication. It cannot be argued, they say, from the feeling of “I know,” “I desire,” “I am happy,” or “I am sorry,” that we really directly perceive such a self or soul within us, for these are mere linguistic usages, and such notions do not really signify any perceiver but merely perceptions as knowledge, desire, etc. It is easy to see that such an introspection will naturally mean that the self can at the same time be both subject and object of its cognitions. It cannot be said that in such an expression as “I know the things,” the “self” is revealed in knowledge, as there is no distinction between this and the perception “Here is the thing,” except that in the former case the knowledge of the thing is directly made the object whereas in the latter case it is the thing which is made the object of knowledge. To say that in such cases of introspection as in the self-knowledge involved in “I know myself,” the self is revealed as the seer, is all the more absurd, for the single self cannot cut itself into two, so that one part may see the other. We are therefore forced to the conclusion that in all cases of self-knowledge it is the body that is known and not a separate self. Linguistic usages do not count for much, as we are just as accustomed to say “my body” as “my soul.”

Objections similar to those found against the direct perception of the self in our experiences are also to be urged against any inference of the self as the seat of knowledge, feeling and willing, and the body may equally well be designated as their seat.

The other school designated by Jayanta as the learned (susikshita) Carvaka though ready to admit that there is a separate subject who is the perceiver in man, does not admit as to the immortality of such a self, as we have no memory of any of our past lives.

Buddhism also rejects any permanent soul, but not in the manner of the materialists of whom I have just spoken. The body as well as the soul exists only as a complex of manifold interconnected origination and decease, but neither has any existence as a self-contained substance, existing per se. Sensations, perceptions, and all those processes which make up the inner life, crowd upon one another in motley variety. In the midst of this psychical flux stands consciousness. But consciousness is not different from the perceptions, sensations, ideas, etc., which come and go, though it may in a way be said to superintend them. “We are accustomed to realise our inner life as a comprehensible factor, only when we are allowed to refer to its changing ingredients,—every individual feeling, every distinct act of will,—to one and ever identical ego; but this mode of thinking is fundamentally opposed to Buddhism. Here as everywhere it condemns that fixity which we are prone to give to the flowing current of incidents which is falsely interpreted as abiding substances, A seeing, a hearing, a conceiving, above all, a suffering takes place; but an existence which may be regarded as the seer, the hearer, the sufferer is not recognised.” The stream of sankharas appearing and again vanishing admits of no “I” and no “thou,” but only a phenomenon of the “I” and “thou” which many in their illusion think to be a manifestation of personality. It is like the flame which appears to be at rest but is yet enduring continuous self-production and self-consumption. The arguments against the existence of a permanent self are the same as against the permanence of all other things; for applying their maxim of causal efficiency arthakriyakaritva, the Buddhists declare all things to be momentary and revealed as a moment in the process of origination and decease.1

As against the Carvakas, Nyaya argues that it does not matter whether the molecular transformation of changes (pitharapaka) or the atomic transformation of changes (pilupaka) be accepted, for in either of those views, the body, since it must suffer changes in the different stages of growth and decay, cannot be held to be the seat of knowledge, desire, etc., or the subject of an unchangeable notion of self. Intoxication cannot be compared with knowledge and the fact that food enhances the power or strength of consciousness, means nothing more than this, that food improves the physical body and with it the power of the senses, and thus the powers of cognition are also enhanced. The senses too cannot be the self, for they ate not only as material as the body but require an organiser and common perceiver and are also often contradicted by one another. Neither can the mind (manas) be regarded as the seat, for it is but the organ of knowledge, desire, etc. So Nyaya holds that a separate self is to be admitted as the seat of knowledge, desire, happiness, etc.,

As against the Buddhists, Nyaya contends that causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) is not the criterion of existence but whatever appears as existent without any contradiction to experience (abadhitasadbuddhi) is to be regarded as existent. Moreover even if the maxim of causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) be accepted, Nyaya holds that the momentariness of things cannot be proved. A thing suffers destruction only when it is destroyed by the operation of an extraneous agency (karakavyapara).2 Again, the phenomena of memory and recognition, those of continuous perception and rebirth, also prove the doctrine of momentariness to be invalid. Thus the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists being dislodged, their theory that there is no permanent soul also falls to the ground.

As to the nature of this soul, Nyaya holds that it can neither be of the nature of pure consciousness (cit) nor an object of pratyaksha, for then it would have revealed itself even without the action of the mental organs ; again even if it could reveal itself how could it be itself its subject as well as the object. So the soul is without any natural consciousness of itself (jada) ; and it is with the acquirement of the attribute of consciousness that it becomes conscious. It can be inferred as the constant seat of its own attributes such as consciousness, etc. It is only its nature that these attributes rest on it alone and not on any other thing, just as smell is the property of earth and not of fire. This soul is eternal, for as it has no parts it cannot be destroyed by the dissolution of parts; as it is not an attribute it cannot be destroyed by the dissolution of any substance, and there is no conceivable cause by which it could be destroyed. This soul is also omnipresent, for being without any physical body it cannot be carried with the body from place to place, and yet wherever the body may be carried there is knowledge, etc., associated with it. Moreover it cannot be atomic, for then we should not have feelings all over the body. It cannot be occupying the extent of the body, for then it would have different dimensions with different bodies; and if it could suffer such changes it would not be eternal. So it has to be admitted that the soul is omnipresent. Souls are many, for without this assumption the different experiences of different men as pleasure, pain, bondage, etc., could not be explained. The soul is not actually connected with any action as real mover, but its agency consists in possessing knowledge, desire, etc., the actual action is performed therefore by the accessories such as the body and the senses. From all these considerations we find that there cannot be any objection against the eternality of the self, and this is further strengthened by the presence of instinctive fear, desire, etc., in children, which proves that they must have felt them in another birth. Prabhakara’s view agrees in general with the Nyaya theory of soul except as to the self-luminosity of knowledge and its necessary consequences. The Nyaya holds that the soul is to be inferred from knowledge, desire, etc., as one constant entity capable of possessing them, but Prabhakara holds that both the self as the notion of “I”3 and the object are revealed in self-luminous knowledge and so there is no necessity for any inference or for accepting the view that it is through the mind that the self is known, for then the self would become the perceiver as well as the perceived, the object and the subject are revealed in one self-revealing knowledge. The soul is the notion of “I” and as such directly given in knowledge. Kumarila differs from Prabhakara in holding that the soul must be the substratum or object of the notion of “I.”4 The soul therefore according to him is known by mental perception. The nature of soul is pure consciousness (cetana) and therefore consciousness here, is not a quality of the soul as in Prabhakara and the Nyayavaiseshika. The souls are, however, many as in the systems of Prabhakara and Nyaya, eternal and omnipresent. The objection of Prabhakara to mental perception (manasapratyaksha) applies therefore directly against Kumarila and he rightly turns the table upon Prabhakara, saying that the objection of the same thing appearing both object and subject applies to the self-luminous knowledge of Prabhakara also. The self is thus according to Kumarila “pure intellectual energy” (citisakti) and in the emancipated state there is no knowledge and no bliss (ananda) such as a Vedantin would hold, for the soul exists in this state in its own true nature as pure power of knowledge (jnanasakti).

Ramanuja holds that the self is a nonmaterial principle, which means that it shines by itself and does not require the aid of knowledge for its illumination. It is of the nature of bliss (anandarupa) and exists for all time, i.e. is eternal. It is atomic in size, and yet can feel the affections in distant parts of the body, for just as the rays of the sun radiate to a great distance, so likewise its knowledge spreads all over the body.5 It is beyond the knowledge of the senses, changeless, partless and a receptacle of knowledge (as contrasted with the Vedanta of the Sankara School). It is itself agent and enjoyer, though worldly actions are said to be due to the connection of the gunas. The power of this agency however is ultimately derived from God (Isvara) and the agency of the soul is realised in action only through Isvara’s will. But the soul is responsible for its actions, because Isvara fulfils its agency in the way in which the soul desires to act (cetanakrtaprathamaprayatnam apekshya Isvarah pravarttayati). It exists in absolute subordination to Isvara, of whose body it forms part. Souls are infinite in number. They are associated with vidya and desires, etc., by being associated with acit or matter. Knowledge of the self is also like it an eternal non-material substance of the nature of ananda, but the difference between them lies only in the fact that though itself a substance (being non-material as well as endowed with movement and qualities) it is an attribute of the soul and unlike it, capable of contraction and dilatation, and of illuminating all other things though it remains dark with regard to its own nature.

The Vedanta of Sankara however holds that it is one Brahman which appears as many souls. For the sake of convenience it will be well to note here only three typical explanations offered by the different exponents of the appearance of the one as many souls :—

(1) Reflection theory (prativimbavada). The Brahman as pure consciousness and bliss being reflected in the ajnana (nescience) of mind (antahkarana) and its states, appear as individual souls. It is called reflection for like it, the thing reflected (Brahman) is outside, and yet is not different from the image it has projected which appears in the ajnana (of the reflection in a mirror). As the antahkaranas are many, souls appear as many, though none have any real existence. Its characteristic as image is due to the fact that though like an image it appears in the mirror of antahkaranas it is not affected by the limitations of the reflector.

(2) Limitation theory (avacchedavada). The Brahman as associated with ajnana appears as many souls on account of the plurality of the ajnana. Each soul has its own creation and it is only on the basis of similarity that there is agreement regarding the objective perceptions of the souls (pratijivam viyadadi prapancabhedasca).

(3) The idealistic theory of self-creation of all perceptions (drshtisrshtivada). In this view the Brahman appears though itself unchanged through beginningless maya, as jiva, but this illusory appearance is due to ignorance (kaunteyasya eva radheyatvavat avikrtasya atmanah avidyavasat jivabhavah). There is thus only one soul and both the many souls and the world are merely its imaginary creations.

The reasons which all Hindu systems adduce against the Carvaka and Buddhist schools are (1) that the notion of a self or personality as a permanent entity in all experiences cannot be adequately justified in the case of either the ever-changing body or the ever-changing flux of ideas, (2) On ethical and eschatological grounds, also there should be one unchanging soul responsible for all actions, experiences, sufferings and emancipation. The quarrel therefore which the Hindu systems have amongst themselves is only with regard to the nature of this soul or to the substance of its being, its knowledge, experience, etc., and connection with external nature.

The Samkhya-Yoga agrees with the Buddhists in holding that the citta or plane of consciousness is always in a state of change undergoing constant modifications not only when it has to relate itself to the external world but also when it is without any such relation, as in the dream state. There is of course a fundamental unity of relations amongst the mental modifications themselves, and also between them and external nature, as they are all grounded in the three gunas, but this unity of relations and actions in the production of a unity in the diversity of effects presupposes an intelligent being for whom they are intended (cf. their dictum of samghatapararthatvat which hold that all complex groupings imply a teleology or purpose). This teleological attitude is the most important Philosophical consideration which led them to postulate a permanent soul as against the Buddhists. With the Nyaya, knowledge, etc., were qualities and thus presupposed a substance in which they could inhere and their interest in refuting the Buddhists was mainly centred in establishing the existence of permanent substances. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., were not qualities according to Samkhya but states or modifications of citta, or the plane of consciousness and this succession of states could not be said to know itself. It was therefore necessary that there should be a permanent intelligence to whom these might appear and thus be co-ordinated and expressed as the experiences of a person for the states must be the states of a perceiver. Samkhya-Yoga holds that there is an essential difference between this element of permanent perceiver and the general content of mental states as appears in experience. For the. content of states not only assumes the forms of the external world but also suffers change at every moment. The element of the personality is however always abiding. So far as the content of experience has the form of external objects generally or any other kind of form, it is not different in essence from the objects which it copies. The perceptions therefore when looked at apart from the experience of a person are no more than mere reflections, copies, or photographs, as it were, of the gross world of matter. This gross state is at once transformed into a state of effulgence as intelligent experience as soon as it is related to the self of the personality. So far as the notion of personality is concerned it is again a mental state and as such non-intelligent and gross, and as such must be distinguished from the pure intelligence involved in it which like light enlivens the states into intelligent experience. The essential distinction of this pure noumenal intelligence which intelligises all experience, from the mental states is, that it always remains constant and permanent in its true nature as pure intelligence (citsakti).

The Nyaya holds that our knowledge of self does not rise above the descriptive stage as being aware of something, e.g., a book, of desiring something, of feeling pleasure or pain. The self is therefore nothing more than that entity with which the awareness of the different sense-data, the feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., can be associated by inference. But is this true? Let us take the proposition “I am aware of this awareness,” it is not merely a judgment that some person has an awareness of an awareness but it also asserts that the person who is aware of the awareness is the person who is making the judgment. How can I assert this identity if “I” can be known only by description? In that case I am aware of this awareness and of making a judgment and I may be entitled to conclude that there is some one who is aware of the awareness and that some one is making the judgment since both awareness and judgment require persons to make them. It may be that “the person who is aware of this awareness” is an exclusive description of the person to whom it applies. But how do I know that the person thus described is the person who makes the judgment? If I am not aware of myself, the only thing that I know about the person who makes the judgment is just the description “the person who makes this judgment.” Granting that this is an exclusive description, I am still not entitled to say “I am aware of this awareness” unless I know that the two exclusive descriptions apply to the same person. If the person is known only by these descriptions or by other descriptions it is not possible to know anything of the sort. If “I” can be known only by description it seems impossible that I can know that I am aware of this awareness or of anything else, since the judgment “I am aware of this” always means that the person who knows this is also the person who makes the judgment.

If, however, I perceive my self, there is no difficulty in justifying either the proposition “I am aware of this awareness” or “I am aware of this thing.” If it is said that this means that I know the self with the two characteristics of having the awareness and of making the judgment, the answer will be that to know the “self” to be the possessor of those two qualities, the self must be known not merely in an indifferent manner as their vehicles but as the “I,” the experiencer. The person who has the awareness is the same that passes the judgment; the volitional aspect (kartrtva) and the aspect as enjoyer of experiences (bhoktrtva) go together and reveal themselves in the notion of the self and this manifestation of the self in experience at once raises it to the plane of intelligibility ; without it the awareness as such (though it might be mine) would be as intelligenceless as the direct Awareness of other persons is to me, Purusha has thus to be admitted as the principle of intelligence. The Nyaya and Jaina objections that if purusha were the principle of intelligence, then all things should be directly illuminated by it, and there would be no need of the help of any organ such as the Buddhi, is groundless, for knowledge in our ordinary sense means, that limited content should appear revealed as the experience of a person ; it cannot therefore be supposed that pure knowledge which is without any content can be known. The knowledge that we speak of can only be of a certain content in the domain of relativity, change and limitation. So the pure intelligence though it is self-revealed and though it illumines and reveals the ordinary contents of our knowledge and feelings, is yet an entity which cannot be interpreted in terms of ordinary consciousness,

Self-consciousness can therefore he affirmed of such an entity in the sense that it is pure intelligence and yet denied in the sense that it has no self-consciousness in the ordinary sense of the term, for what we call self-consciousness is but the illumination of a content, and thus limited in its nature, and hence the result of the union of the self with the states of the plane of consciousness.

Hume went side by side with Buddhism when he supposed that our selves were nothing but bundles or collections of different perceptions which succeed one other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement. The fallacy of such a position lies in this that though all the contents of self, pains, pleasures, griefs, joys, sensations, etc., fall within various mental states, yet while these change, the self remains the same. The self again which was not intelligence by its own nature and which only acquired consciousness by the ordinary processes (as in the case of Nyaya) would be in its pure and emancipated state in no way better than pure vacuity and in the ordinary state also there is no reason why knowledge should be its peculiar gift or property.

It may now be objected from the Ramanuja and other similar points of view that since personality involves the notions of a determiner and experience, it is better rather to say that the soul actually experiences and determines, the answer is that if it really experiences and determines diverse contents, it must change itself with them for if it be absolutely the same it can never determine or experience different things at different times; for that which is absolutely the same cannot itself change its relations with other things. It is for this reason that it is held that it is the things, the contents, which are modified and changed in such a way that they are all illuminated by the purusha and thus project the appearance that it is the purusha which is determining or experiencing. The purusha remains however the pure and unchangeable entity of pure intelligence which never really determines nor experiences.

Both the Prabhakara and the Bhatta schools are guilty of the charge of self-objectification of knowledges and of self respectively, as each has pointed out of the other. Prabhakara moreover inverts the true relation in holding that it is the knowledge which reveals the self and not that the self that reveals knowledge.

As regards the Sankara school, it holds that (1) bliss or ananda does not mean anything more than happiness and this is always an object of knowledge; so if at the state of emancipation there is this happiness then it presupposes that there also must then be a subject who feels it and thus monism fails. It cannot be said again that it is of the nature of happiness to be identical with intelligence (cit) for these are related as object and subject and hence cannot be identified. (2) The Vedanta explains all the appearance of the world with the help of avidya, but when asked to describe its nature gives evasive answers and when further pressed says that it is illusory and has no real existence. If it is at the root of all worldly appearances, it has necessarily to be admitted that it has real existence, for, if inspite of its hand in bringing about this manifold world and diverse experiences of the world appearance, its existence could be denied, then verily the existence of anything and everything could be denied.

(3) Its doctrine of the Brahman appearing as numberless souls stand refuted in all other systems of Hindu thought as it cannot explain any of the questions relating to individual birth, death, experiences or salvation.

Thus the Samkhya-Yoga holds that (1) the soul is pure intelligence and that all the cognitive states of ideas, feeling, etc., are illuminated by it.

(2) As against the Jains and the school of Ramanuja, it agrees with the Naiyayikas in holding that the souls are omnipresent. (3) They are numberless, absolutely actionless, and passionless, remaining ever the same with absolutely no change.

The most important problem in Samkhya-Yoga philosophy is therefore the establishment of the relation of the purusha with the prakrti or the three gunas which form the substratum of the conscious plane on one side and of the objective world on the other. The difficulty lies in this that purusha in its nature as pure intelligence is absolutely unrelatable with any change, but the states in which we find it reflected are all made of the stuff of the gunas which are constantly changing. Change is as much the character of the prakrti as changelessness of the purusha; intelligence is the essence of the purusha, whereas non-intelligence is the characteristic of the prakrti. Yet it is said that all the movements of the prakrti are for the experiences and liberation of the purusha and it is held at the same time that the purusha stands always as emancipated, and cannot be the determiner of the prakrti. How are the two to be brought together and yet held in such a state of aloofness that the purity of the purusha may remain intact ?

We know that according to Samkhya-Yoga the prakrti takes two developments, one on the mental side, another, on the side of the exterior world. The mental plane takes the copy or the reduction of the external objects and the result is the perceptions which are but the reproductions (though distorted through the senses) in the stuff of the mental material. These mental images are enlivened by the influence of the pure intelligence, the purusha. The material of both the mental plane and of the exterior world is the three gunas. Of these, sattva, which we have already described, resembles most the nature of the Purusha ; in fact it is called in the Bhojavrtti the second citsakti with this difference only that its cit requires for its manifestations association with the purusha. It is through this sattva that the Samkhya-Yoga has striven to solve the vital difficulty of the system, namely that of connecting the purusha with the prakrti.

The commentators have tried to understand this connection in diverse ways. Some have taken the sattva to be a second kind of intelligence, which is kindled by the influence of the purusha ; others have taken the sattva to be so translucent that intelligence is reflected in it, though there is no real contact while others have held that there is a real contact between the two. Let us take these views one by one. Bhoja says that just as the proximity of a magnet manifests the power of movement in a piece of iron, so by the mere proximity of the purusha, the cit which exist in a potential manner as it were in the sattva, becomes manifest and this manifestation of cit which illumines the whole vrtti or state becomes the object of purusha’s experience partly because of the closest proximity of the purusha and partly because the whole process of prakrti’s transformations is for the experiences and the liberation of the purusha. Prakrti is not conscious that it will serve the purpose of the purusha but its forward and backward transformations are called its tendencies for the services of the purushas. The prakrti naturally possesses these two tendencies though it is unconscious. When it exhausts its powers in this way with reference to purusha it cannot again repeat the process. As both the prakrti and the purusha are omnipresent, there cannot be any actual contact or samyoga. It is the proximity and the teleology of the purusha that effects the illumination in the citta the object of the purusha’s experience so far only as it is kindled by its presence. So there is no actual reflection also; but when reflection or prativimba is spoken of in this connection, what is meant is that as in a reflection there is the projection of a similar image so here also by the proximity of the purusha an intelligence is manifested in the sattva which is quite similar to the intelligence of the purusha.

Vacaspati Misra however seems to hold that there is no samyoga or contact of the buddhi with the purusha but a reflection of the purusha is caught in the states of the buddhi, by virtue of which these become intelligised and transformed into consciousness. But this view is said to be open to the objection that it does not explain how the purusha can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely the image, and there cannot be any experience (bhoga) on the basis of that image merely, as actually there is no connection of the purusha with the buddhi. The answer of Misra is that there is no contact (samyoga) between them in space or time but the sannidhi or proximity here means “yogyata” or passive capacity of being treated and by virtue of it the purusha, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified with the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear ascribed to a person. The modifications of the buddhi as states, on account of their extreme translucent character,6 catch the reflection of the purusha and are not only intelligised but become expressed as the experiences of a person or purusha, and it is in this way that it may be said to have been useful to the purusha. Thus it is that though the purusha remains absolutely pure and unperturbed yet it experiences the states of the prakrti.7

Vijnana Bhikshu differs from Vacaspati as to this being the Samkhya doctrine. His objection is first, that such a yogyata or capacity on the part of the purusha by virtue of which even though it may not be in touch with the buddhi yet the states of buddhi can continue to be expressed in terms of an experiencer, will continue even in the state of emancipation ; for it is the nature of the purusha, and so the experience will continue even in the emancipated state. Second, if the beginningless experience of states be said to be serving the purpose of samyoga or contact, then the assertion of the Bhashya that this seeming union is due to avidya potency breaks down. Thirdly the objection of Vacaspati that a samyoga of the buddhi and the purusha will necessarily mean that the purusha is exposed to change is groundless, for samyoga and change are not synonymous. The akasa has also samyoga, but it is not by virtue of that called parinamin or changing. Change means the rise of new qualities.

It is the buddhi which knows or forms its states (either through the inner action of its own potencies or by copying the objective world directly) and when this is reflected in the purushas, there is the notion of the person or the experiencer in the purusha and when the cit is reflected in the buddhi there is the knowledge as conscious state in the buddhi. The notion of the knower as “I” the experience cannot be generated in the buddhi by the reflection of the cit, for the mere reflection cannot be said to be of any purpose. It is when by the reflection of the cit, the states of buddhi become intelligised, that the purusha shines forth through their reflections as the cogniser of those states. If the notion of cogniser had also been in the buddhi, then there would be no necessity of a separate purusha. Thus the bondage continues so long as this mutual reflection continues through the action of the prakrti. The cit does not become actually a part of the states of buddhi but just as by the mere presence of fire the iron becomes red-hot, so by the mere proximity of purusha the mind becomes illuminated ; and it has to be assumed that this contact (samyoga) is due to the manifestation of that translucent character in the citta, the sattva, for purusha is unchanging and could not therefore be made responsible for the connection. Thus we see that to account for the knower in knowledge the purusha has to be admitted as the pure entity which intelligises all states by reflection. The Naiyayikas are wrong in saying that the self is the vehicle of jnana but Bhikshu agrees with them so far that the jnana is no real part of the person the knower or the self, and that their unity “I know this” as a mental state is false so far as the “I” is concerned. Yet this union is necessary for revelation even of the “I” as its notion in a conscious state,

When we look to the Yogasutra, we find that questions regarding prakrti and purusha have been discussed in ii. 6, ii. 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, iii. 35, iv. 22, etc. In ii. 6 drk or purusha, the seer is spoken of as power (sakti) as much as prakrti itself, and we see that their identity is a seeming one. Vyasa in his Bhashya explains “ekatmata” or identity as avibhaga-praptau iva, i.e., as if they were so mixed up that no distinction could be made between them; and Pancasikha writes, “not knowing the purusha beyond the buddhi to be different from it in nature, character, and knowledge, etc., a man has by forgetfulness the notion of self therein.” Thus we see that when they are known to be separate the real nature of the purusha is realised. This seeming identity is again described as “pratyayanupasya”—it illuminates the conceptual forms of thought and though different, appears as if it were identically the same as the concepts of thought.

The purusha cognises the phenomena of consciousness after they have been formed and though its nature is different from them, yet it does not appear to be in any way different from them. Vyasa in explaining this sutra says that the purusha is neither quite similar to the buddhi nor altogether different from it. For the buddhi must be said to be changeful according to the change of objects that are offered to it, and according as it knows objects or does not know them. But the purusha is not such, for it always appears as the self, howsoever the other contents or objects of knowledge may change. As the contents of knowledge belong to the buddhi and as its connection with the “I” only intelligises these into the conscious states of a person, the purusha may be said in a way to see again that which was perceived by the buddhi and thus impart consciousness by transforming its illumination into the buddhi. The buddhi suffers modifications according to the forms of the objects of cognition and thus a state of conscious cognition in the shape of “I know it” results when it becomes connected with the constant factor of the transcendent reflection or identification of the purusha with the buddhi. Whether the process can be called a reflection is open to objection and criticism. But the Samkhya-Yoga rests here on its analysis of consciousness, as also on the traditional teachings of the Upanishads, that the self, as the permanent experiencer which reveals itself as the notion of “I” in consciousness, has an essentially different nature in its character as permanent and unchangeable, though in point of mere intelligence it highly resembles the sattva. What gives the conscious states their true character as conscious is not merely their intelligent character, but their expression in connection with a person or rather as the experiences of a person. The notion of “I” however is not the principle as a Prabhakara would say but merely the product of the unity of the self with the buddhi. The substratum which I perceive of the notion of the “I” through mental perception is not also the self as a follower of Kumarila the great Mimamsa philosopher might think, but the self is that element by coming in touch with which the states of buddhi become expressed as my experiences or the experiences of an “I” as the experiencer. The “I” so far as it is a vriti or state is a modification of the buddhi, but it does not change like other contents and is an indication of the permanent self as intelligising the states. The knowledge belongs to the self, but the states belong to the buddhi. The self is no part of buddhi, but yet as the Bhashya says it appears as a state of buddhi as the notion of self experiencing the cognitions and as such within them. The sattva element which predominates in buddhi is so pure and of so intelligent a character (as we have noticed many times before), that it can become as absolutely contentless as the purusha.8 So when the buddhi has been modified into its states, it may be said in some sense to have been intelligised, for buddhi is itself of a translucent nature, but even this state is called jada as there is no self, no knower, and the only distinction between intelligent states and material states is this element of self or “I.” This modification of the translucent buddhi therefore cannot ultimately be distinguished from other material states, as the difference between the two is one of degree of manifestation of sattva and not of kind. It is when the self comes in that the distinction becomes one of kind as apart from that of degree. These states of buddhi have therefore to be intelligised over again by coming in touch with the self. So our process of knowing an external object may be said to be one of double-intelligising, first by being imaged by buddhi and then again by the perception of the light of the purusha and of being transferred over to it for interpretation as its experience. The difference among the commentators rests therefore on the degree of translucency that they are ready to ascribe to sattva. Thus Bhoja does not feel the necessity of assuming any reflection from the purusha beyond the mere excitation of the sleeping intelligence in the sattva itself. Vacaspati thinks that such a reflection is necessary but the other reflection from the buddhi to the purusha unnecessary whereas Bhikshu required them both. The Bhashya merely states the real analysis and is indifferent with regard to the metaphysical fictions over which the commentators quarrel.

The arguments on behalf of the existence of the purusha as summarised in the Samkhyakarika are, (1) because an assemblage of things is for the sake of another and thus there must be some other persons different from the three gunas and their modifications for which they exist ; (2) because there must be simple experiencers different from the complex assemblage of the gunas; (3) because there must be a superintending power; (4) because of the existence of active exertion for the sake of salvation or emancipation.9 The first is teleological, as has already been noticed.10 The second is that the prakrti being a composite of the three gunas cannot itself be the seer. So the seer must be taken as an unchangeable actionless entity, pure intelligence. The third is that there must be a supreme background of pure intelligences, standing on which all our experiences may be co-ordinated and expressed. This background is the pure actionless intelligence, the purusha, by a reflection from which all our mental states are intelligised.11 The fourth is that as the prakrti is non-intelligent there must be one who enjoys the pains and pleasures and experiences the states.

The next important point is the multiplicity of the buddhis. The Karika says that “from the separate allotment of birth, death, and the organs of knowledge, action, etc., from the diversity of occupations at the same time and also from the different conditions of the three modes, it is proved that there is a plurality of souls.” Patanjali, though he does not infer in this way the plurality of the purushas, yet holds this view, as we find in the sutra “krtartham prati nashtamapi anashtam tadanyasadharanatvat.”

If the different selves be the reflections upon different buddhis from one purusha, or aitman as in the Vedanta then the notions of self or personality would be false. For then the only true being would be the being of one purusha. So the knower being false the known also becomes false ; the knower and the known having vanished, everything is reduced to that which we can in no way conceive, viz., the Brahman. It may be argued that according to the Samkhya philosophy also, the knower is false, for the pure purusha as such is not in any way connected with the prakrti. But even then it must be observed that the Samkhya-Yoga view does not hold that the knower is false, but analyses the nature of the ego, and says that it is the seeming unity of buddhi and the purusha, both of which are real in the strictest sense of the terms. Purusha is a real knower there. Its seeing is the reflection of buddhi on it and simultaneously with it the modification of ego comes in the buddhi and this ego then appears as the person who identifies his experiences as his. Purusha thus always remains the real knower. The knower, the ego and the knowable, none of them are false in the Samkhya-Yoga system in any one of the stages preceding emancipation, kaivalya. Sankara’s Vedanta has to admit the modifications of the maya but has at the same time to hold it as unreal. The Vedanta says that the maya is as beginningless as the prakrti and as “santa” (ending) as the buddhi of the Samkhya with reference to the released person. But according to the Vedanta the notion of the self as the experiencer is only false knowledge—an illusion imposed upon the formless Brahman as many. The maya according to Sankara can neither be said to exist nor to non-exist. It is anirvacya, i.e., can never be described or defined. Such an unknown and unknowable maya by its reflection upon the Brahman causes the many of the world. But according to the Samkhya doctrine, the prakrti is as real as the purusha itself. They are the two irreducible metaphysical remainders, the purusha and the prakrti. Their connection is beginningless. But the connection is not unreal in the Vedanta sense of the term. We see that according to the Vedanta system, all notions of ego, or personality, are false and are originated by the illusive action of the maya, so that when they ultimately vanish, there are no other remainders except the Brahman. But this is not the case with Samkhya, for as the purusha is the real seer, its cognitions cannot be dismissed as unreal, and so the purushas or the knowers as they appear to us must be held to be real so far as they are not identified with the contents of knowledge. As the prakrti is not the maya of the Vedantists the nature of whose influence over the spiritual principle cannot be determined, we cannot account for the plurality of the purushas by supposing that one purusha is being reflected into many buddhis and generating the many egoes. For in that case it will be difficult to explain the plurality of their appearances in the buddhis. For if there be one spiritual principle, how should we account for the supposed plurality of the buddhis? For to serve the supposed one purusha we should rather expect to find one buddhi and not many, and this will only mean that there will be only one ego, his experience and release. Supposing for argument sake that there are many buddhis and one purusha, which being reflected into them is the cause of the plurality of selves, then also we cannot see how the prakrti is moving, for the experience and release of one purusha, it would rather appear to be moved for the sake of the experience and release of the reflected or unreal self. For the purusha is not finally released with the release of any number of particular individual selves. For it may be released with reference to one individual but will remain bound in connection with others. So the prakrti would not really be moved in this suppositional case for the sake of the purusha, but only for the sake of the reflected self. If we suppose that it takes place in such a way as to avoid the said difficulties, then with the release of one purusha all purushas must be released. For on the supposed theory there would not really be many different purushas, but one purusha, which had appeared as many, so that with its release all the other so-called purushas must be released. On the experience, birth, emancipation, or death of one purusha we should expect the same for all purushas.

So we see that from the position in which Kapila and Patanjali were standing, this plurality of the purushas was the most consistent thing that they could think of. Any compromise with the Vedanta doctrine here would have greatly changed the philosophical aspect and value of the Samkhya philosophy. The purushas are nothing but pure intelligences ; though many they are regarded as all-pervading. But there is another objection that number is a conception of the phenomenal mind, how then can it be applied to the purushas which are said to be many? But that difficulty remains unabated even though we should regard the purusha as one. When we go into the domain of metaphysics, and try to represent the reality with the symbols of our phenomenal conceptions, we have really to commit almost a violence to it. But this must be allowed in all our attempts to philosophise or to express that pure inexpressible, free illumination which exists in and for itself beyond the range of any mediation by the concepts or images of our mind in terms of our conceptions.12

Notes

  1. For Buddhistic arguments in favour of the doctrine of momentariness (kshanabhangavada) see Nyayamanjari of Jayanta and Nyayavarttikatatparyatika of Vacaspati. Ratnakirtti's contributions in this direction through anvayavyapti and vyatirekavyapti are invaluable. For the Madhyamika view see Nagarjuna's Karika, 18th Chapter, and Candrakirti's commentary.
  2. For Nyaya arguments against momentariness (Kshanabhangavada) see Nyayamanjari.
  3. Even if it is accepted that the soul is perceivable directly, yet for inferring the soul in general of other people, the inference is necessary.
  4. It must be noted in this connection that the inference of soul is not from changing acts of knowledge to a permanent entity or from effect to cause, but according to Nyaya the relation of substance with attributes and actions is that attributes and actions must inhere in substances. So cognition (jnana), desire (iccha), etc., being attributes (gunas) must have a permanent substratum in which they may inhere. This substratum is the self.
  5. The simile used by the Jains in explaining the pervasion of the body by the soul is just the same though on the basis of their expression “anugurudehapramana” they are charged with thinking the soul to be of the size of the body it occupies.
  6. Bhojavrtti, IV. 22 and II. 23.
  7. Tattvavaisaradi, II. 17 and I. 4.
  8. The sutra “sattvapurushayoh suddhisamye kaivalyam” supposes that the buddhi can be as pure as the purusha and this state in which it reflects the purusha in its absolute purity without any other content does not materially differ from the state of aloneness (kaivalya), for the next stage is only the return of the buddhi to prakrti and the ultimate escape from sufferings and experiences came about when the buddhi could no longer bind the purusha again. The only distinction is that when the buddhi is as pure as purusha, it is still a phenomenal state, whereas when it returns to the Prakrti the state is metaphysically reduced to a noumenal one.
  9. Samkhya-karika, 17.
  10. We have already noticed that Bhoja differs on this point, and says that it only excites cit in the sattva as movement in the iron by the magnet. Bhikshu however takes the simile of cittamayaskantamanikalpam sannidhimatropakari in the sense that as the magnet draws out an iron nail stuck in the hand and thus benefits the man, so the citta also brings the objects of experience to the purusha and brings about its experience.
  11. Davies commits a mistake in his translation of the Samkhya Karika in interpreting the simile “yatha rathadayah yantradibhih” to mean that the purusha must have some activity like the charioteer, for the comparison holds only so far that the chariot can take a particular course only when there is a particular purpose of the charioteer to perform.
  12. Bhikshu however thinks that the determinations of number or content does not in any way make the thing parinamin or changeable. Yogavarttika, II. 17.

Source

S. N. Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930. Chapter V (printed pages 136–171). This article is from public domain digital sources.

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