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Jainism: Jaina Logic, Pramāṇa and Inference

by Jagmanderlal Jaini, from Outlines of Jainism (1916)

Summary: The first of three pages from the appendix on Jaina logic in Jaini’s Outlines of Jainism. It contrasts Jaina logic with Western logic and gives its aim, to remove ignorance and acquire knowledge. It then treats pramana, the means of proving things, in its two forms, direct knowledge (pratyaksha) and indirect knowledge (paroksha), including inference and anupalabdhi, and ends with the objects of pramana.

Western logic is material or formal and inductive or deductive. Its chief topics are the term, the proposition, and the syllogism. Its aim is consistency in argument—formal truth mostly.

Jaina logic has for its aim to remove ignorance; to acquire knowledge; to know what is harmful, what is beneficial and to be adopted, and to what it is fit to be indifferent. The whole of Jainism follows the maxim: Do not live to know, but know to live. Logic is not mental training merely: it is a necessary help in ascertaining the truth, as we move along.

How to achieve this aim? By proving things through pramāṇa.

What is pramāṇa? It is that by which is established the knowledge of the self and of that which was not known before.

It also means the way of knowing a thing without doubt, perversion, and indifference; e.g. I know a jar by myself. Conviction in this proves existence of the self and the jar both. [Compare the conclusion of Descartes: Cogito, ergo sum.]

Besides (i) pramāṇas we have (ii) nayas and (iii) syād-vāda.

Pramāṇas are of two kinds: pratyaksha and paroksha.

Pratyaksha

It is of two kinds: sāṃvyavahārika-pratyaksha, or the way of knowing things by means of the five senses and the mind; pāramārthika-pratyaksha, the way of knowing things by the soul itself through removal of all karmic matter that obscures its knowledge.

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Paroksha

This is of five kinds:

1. smṛiti, remembrance;

2. pratyabhijñāna, memory by sight, i.e. recognition;

3. tarka, argument from association; e.g. birth and pregnancy; smoke and fire; rain and wet pavement; dawn and lotus-blossoming;

4. anumāna, inference; this is of two kinds:

(1) upalabdhi, establishing an affirmative or negative proposition by a positive middle.

(2) anupalabdhi, establishing an affirmative or negative proposition by a negative middle.

5. āgama, śabda, knowledge from what the Teacher has said.

Under 4 (anumāna) upalabdhi is of six kinds, which are aviruddha, viz. according as the (positive) middle term is:

1. vyāpya, comprehended: infer fire by smoke;

2. kārya, effect: wisdom by eloquent speech;

3. kāraṇa, cause: shade by tree;

4. pūrva-chara, priority: darkness by sunset;

5. uttara-chara, posteriority: sunset by darkness;

6. saha-chara, concomitance: sweet-mango by yellow-ripe.

Seven kinds, which are viruddha, viz. according as the (positive) middle term is:

1. svabhāva, property of major: no cold by heat;

2. vyāpya: no quiescence by anger;

3. kārya: no cold by smoke;

4. kāraṇa: no happiness in the world by soul is impure;

5. pūrva-chara: no sunset by daylight;

6. uttara-chara: no daylight by sunset;

7. saha-chara: no not-sweet by yellow-ripe mango.

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Anupalabdhi

Anupalabdhi also has sub-kinds: aviruddha and viruddha.

Seven aviruddha kinds, viz. according as the (negative) middle term is:

1. svabhāva: no jug here, because none is visible;

2. vyāpaka: no mango-tree, because no tree;

3. kārya: no good seed, because no sprout;

4. kāraṇa: no smoke, because no fire;

5. pūrva-chara: no rise of Rohiṇī (constellation) in two ghaṭīs, because Kṛittikā has not risen now;

6. uttara-chara: no rise of Bharaṇī two ghaṭīs ago, because Kṛittikā has not risen now;

7. saha-chara: no rise in one scale-pan, because there is no lowering of the other.

Five Viruddha-anupalabdhis (with negative middle):

1. svabhāva: things are many-sided, because we cannot get a purely one-sided thing;

2. vyāpaka: shade by no heat;

3. kārya: this man is ill, because he has no appearance or sign of health;

4. kāraṇa: this man is in pain, because he has not attained his desire;

5. saha-chara: false view by no true view.

The objects of pramāṇa are sāmānya, common qualities, i.e. generic attributes; or viśesha, distinguishing attributes, i.e. differentia. This twofold distinction is applied to substances, attributes, and modifications.

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Source

Jagmanderlal Jaini, Outlines of Jainism, edited with a preliminary note by F. W. Thomas. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1916. Appendix I, Jaina Logic (printed pages 112–115, first part). This article is from public domain digital sources.

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