Summary: Two chapters from A. Berriedale Keith’s 1921 study of the Karma Mimamsa, the school of Hindu thought concerned with Vedic ritual. The first part, which begins in the middle of chapter I, traces the development and literary history of the school, including the date of Jaimini’s Sutra and its early commentators. The second, chapter IV, explains the school’s view of God, the soul and matter, including its rejection of a creator who rewards and punishes, as argued by Prabhakara and Kumarila.
The Development and Literary History of the Karma Mimamsa
and, unless this is established, the argument for contemporaneity is invalid. It is true that it is impossible to deduce from the style of the Mimamsa as Purva-Mimamsa a relation of temporal priority for Jaimini's work; the Mimamsa is prior to the Vedanta because it deals with the sacred rites, the knowledge of which, in the view of one school of Vedanta, is an indispensable preliminary to the knowledge of the absolute, though Sankara declines to accept this view and insists instead on the diverse character of the ends of the two disciplines, which renders it impossible to treat the former as the normal or necessary prelude to the latter.1 Nonetheless it remains true that we must assume that the Mimamsa as a science developed before the Vedanta.2 The former was plainly necessitated by the development of the sacrificial ritual with which it is immediately connected, and it serves an important practical end; the latter is proof of the growth of a philosophical spirit, which sought to comprehend as a whole the extremely varied speculations which are scattered in the Aranyakas and Upanishads. While, of course, it is not impossible that the redaction of the two Sutras was contemporaneous, despite the earlier development of the Mimamsa, the probability surely lies in favour of the view that the Mimamsa Sutra was redacted first and served as a model for the other schools.
Even if this view is accepted, it remains difficult to assign any definite date to the Sutra. It contains no certain reference to Buddhist tenets of any kind, for the term buddha, in I, 2, 33, has not this signification, and we need not with Kumarila read a reference to Buddhism into I, 3, 5, and 6. The Vedanta Sutra is of uncertain date; if we believe Sankara, it criticises (II, 2, 28-32) the Vijnanavada school of Buddhism, but this doctrine is probably wrong3 and we need see only a reference to the Sunyavada of Nagarjuna. The date of this school is uncertain; if we accept the opinion that it was not enunciated before Nagarjuna in such a manner as to invite criticism in the Vedanta Sutra, that work cannot be earlier than the third century A.D., for Aryadeva, Nagarjuna's contemporary, refers to the zodiacal signs and the week-days, which were not known in India until that epoch. But it is possible that the Sunyavada, which can be recognised in Asvaghosa, was of older fame than Nagarjuna, though on the whole it is more likely than not that it was the dialectical ability of that teacher which made the doctrine the object of Vedantic confutation. It is, then, a plausible conclusion that the Mimamsa Sutra does not date after 200 A.D., but that it is probably not much earlier, since otherwise it would have been natural to find in the Mahabharata some reference to it and to its author.
As we have seen, the Sutra must from the first have been accompanied by a comment, which in course of time was lost or became defective. The first commentator of whom we have certain knowledge is a Vrittikara, from whose work a long extract is made in the Bhasya of Sabarasvamin on Mimamsa Sutra, I, 1, 5, in which the author attacks and refutes Buddhist views. If we believe Kumarila, the discussion is directed in part against the Vijnanavada school, in part against the Sunyavada, but in this case we have every reason to distrust his assertion, for, plainly by error, he ascribes the major portion of the discussion to Sabarasvamin, and not to the Vrittikara. It is, therefore, not improbable that he is also in error in finding any reference to the Vijnanavada, for the passage seems to deal with one topic only, and that the Sunyavada. It follows, accordingly, that the date of the Vrittikara was probably not later than the fourth century A.D., since, had he lived later, he would hardly have omitted an explicit discussion of the tenets of the idealistic school of Buddhism.
The name of the Vrittikara is uncertain. The conjecture4 that he was Bhavadasa, mentioned in one place by Kumarila, may be dismissed as wholly without support. The current opinion makes him to be Upavarsa, who, we know from Sankara (Vedanta Sutra, III, 3, 53) wrote on both the texts. To this the objection has been brought that in the passage cited from the Vrittikara by Sabarasvamin there is a reference to Upavarsa with the epithet Bhagavat, implying that he was in the eyes of the Vrittikara an author of venerable authority. It is probable, however, that the citation from the Vrittikara is only a resume,5 not a verbatim quotation, and that Sabarasvamin is responsible for the reference5 to Upavarsa, the Vrittikara's proper name, and for this view support may be derived from the mode in which the Vrittikara and Upavarsa are referred to by Kumarila elsewhere (II, 3, 16). If this view is rejected, it is possible that he is Bodhayana, who certainly wrote on the Vedanta Sutra, but this theory is a bare and unnecessary conjecture, seeing that Bodhayana nowhere else appears as a Mimamsa authority. Of other, presumably early, commentators we hear of Bhartrimitra6 and Hari,7 but there is no reason to identify either of these with the Vrittikara.
The extract from the Vrittikara proves that an important addition has been made to the teaching of the Mimamsa in the shape of the introduction of discussions of the validity of knowledge and its diverse forms. The Sutra itself is content with the denial of the validity of perception for the purpose of the knowledge of Dharma, and the exaltation of Vedic injunctions as the source of the necessary knowledge; under the influence, perhaps, of the Nyaya the earlier doctrine is now elaborated into a critical examination of the nature of evidence, its validity, and the forms of proof. It is not illegitimate to assume that the Vrittikara indulged also in metaphysical discussions; at any rate Sabarasvamin enters into a long discussion of the nature of soul, despite his predilection for brevity in treatment of the Sutra. The Mimamsa therefore by this time enters into the whole field of philosophy, while maintaining its primary duty of expounding the rules by which the ritual can be reconstructed from the Brahmanas and the Samhitas.
Of Sabarasvamin, whose commentary forms the starting point for later discussion, we know practically nothing. It is an idle fiction which makes him the father of the mythical founder of the Vikrama era (57 B.C.), of Bhartrihari, and Varahamihira, his true name being Adityadeva, while he adopted the soubriquet Sabara, when he disguised himself as a forester to avoid Jain persecution. The form of his name and his relation to the Vrittikara suggest that 400 A.D. is the earliest date to which he can be assigned; the later limit is vaguely indicated by his priority to Prabhakara, Kumarila, and Sankara.
With Prabhakara and Kumarila there comes a sharp divergence in the unity of the teaching of the school, whose followers henceforth are divided between the adherents of Prabhakara, or the Guru par excellence, and the supporters of Kumarila Bhatta. It does not, however, appear that Prabhakara initiated the views which he became noted for expounding; he cites in the Brihati, his ‘great’ exposition of Sabarasvamin's Bhasya, the opinions of a Varttikakara who presumably must be regarded as the true founder of the school. The Brihati itself is unfortunately only extant in imperfect form;8 it was commented on by Salikanatha in his Rijuvimala, formerly erroneously regarded as simply a commentary on the Sabarabhasya, while in his Prakaranapanchika9 the same author deals with the more important epistemological and metaphysical views of his teacher. The Brihati seems to have passed comparatively early into oblivion, though a passage from it is cited in the Mitaksara and its author's views were well known in Mimamsa circles.
The relation of Prabhakara and Kumarila is represented by tradition as those of pupil and teacher; the tradition is fairly old, as it occurs in the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha (I, 18, 19; VII, 15) attributed, doubtless wrongly, to Sankara himself. But the discovery of the text of the Brihati has enabled us to correct this error. Prabhakara follows Sabarasvamin closely; he does not refute the opinions of Kumarila; in one passage (IV, 1, 2), when he does criticise an opinion of the latter, the form of words used by him in adducing it differs entirely from those in which the view of Kumarila is expressed, showing clearly that he is dealing with some older author, whom Kumarila has followed. On the other hand, Kumarila frequently diverges from the views of the Bhasya; he criticises (I, 2, 31; 3, 2; 4, 1) views which are expressed by Prabhakara, and asserts independent views. There is a clear difference of style between the two authors; Prabhakara is comparatively simple, vivid and direct like Sabarasvamin; he seldom uses long compounds; he avoids the combination of various reasonings in a single clause; in lieu of the formal terminology of objection and reply (nanu . . . ced, na or syad etat . . . tad ayuktam) he adopts the form of question and answer, which, however, has the disadvantage of leaving at times the meaning in doubt. In all these aspects Kumarila shows a richer, more varied, and elaborated style, which is reminiscent of the Sarirakabhasya of Sankara.
Kumarila's great exposition of the Sabarabhasya falls into three parts, the first, the Slokavarttika,10 in verse, deals with Pada I of Adhyaya I of the Bhasya, and is of the greatest value as an explanation of the metaphysics and epistemology of his system. The second, the Tantravarttika,11 covers the remaining three Padas of Adhyaya I and the whole of Adhyayas II and III. The third part, the Tuptika, consists merely of scattered notes on the last nine Adhyayas. Each part has been commented on; the first by Parthasarathi Misra in his Nyayaratnakara, and by Sucharita Misra in his Kasika; the second by Somesvara, son of Mahadeva, in his Nyayasudha or Ranaka; the third by Venkatesvara Diksita in his Varttikabharana. Kumarila's date is determinate within definite limits;12 he used the Vakyapadiya of Bhartrihari; neither Hiuen-Thsang nor I-tsing mentions him; he was before Sankara; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra, but is not answered by Akalanka in his Astasati, which comments on the Aptamimamsa. On the other hand, he is freely attacked by Vidyananda and Prabhachandra, who both lived before 838 A.D. Vidyananda assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakirti, and Prabhakara, on the latter point agreeing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit of date is, therefore, not earlier than 700 A.D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Sankara and the latter's exact date. Later tradition, the Sankaravijayas of Madhava and the pseudo-Anandagiri, would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer.
Only slightly later than Kumarila was Mandana Misra, author of the Vidhiviveka, a treatise on the significance of injunctions, and the Mimamsanukramani, a summary of Sabarasvamin's Bhasya. The tradition of the Sankaravijayas makes him out to be identical with Suresvara, a pupil of Sankara, but Anandagiri's account insists that he was also a pupil of Kumarila. The identification with Suresvara, which might be suspected because of the lateness and inferior character of the authorities, is to some extent confirmed by Vidyananda's description13 of Mandana Misra as Vedantavadin, which could hardly apply to him unless he were the author of the works ascribed to Suresvara. His direct connection with Kumarila, however, need not be insisted upon. His lower limit of date is fixed by the fact that the famous Vachaspati Misra devoted the Nyayakanika to the exposition of his Vidhiviveka,14 and Vachaspati probably lived about 850 A.D. He wrote also the Tattvabindu15 on Kumarila's views.
Of the later writers the most important is perhaps Parthasarathi Misra, who wrote the Sastradipika16 to explain the Sutra; on it commented, in 1543 A.D., Ramakrishna Bhatta, son of Madhava, in the Yuktisnehaprapurani, Somanatha, son of Sura Bhatta, an Andhra Brahman of the Nittal family, in his Mayukhamalika, Vaidyanatha (1710 A.D.), Bhatta Sankara, Bhatta Dinakara, Kamalakara, and others. His Tantraratna comments on points in the last nine Adhyayas of the Sutra and the Bhasya, while his Nyayaratnamala17 is an independent treatise on which Ramanuja, apparently the great Vedantist, has written a comment, the Nayakaratna.
Much later in date is Khandadeva, who died at Benares in 1665 A.D. His works, the Bhattadipika, and on a larger scale the Mimamsakaustubha18 deal fully with the Sutra; the former was commented on in 1708 by his pupil Sambhu Bhatta. Value attaches also to the Mimamsasutradidhiti or Nyayavalaladhiti of Raghavananda Sarasvati, pupil of Advaya, pupil of Visvesvara, and to the Mimamsanayaviveka of Bhavanatha Misra, which deals also with Sabarasvamin. Yet other commentaries are recorded, including works by Mahadeva Vedantin, Kamalakara and Vaidyanatha, son of Ramachandra, the Subodhini19 of Ramesvara Suri, the Bhattachintamani of Visvesvara or Gaga Bhatta, etc.
Apart from the Sutra there was developed a considerable literature which aims, as did Mandana Misra, at dealing systematically with the doctrines of the school. First in importance, perhaps, is the Jaiminiyanyayamalavistara20 of the famous Madhava written in the fourteenth century, which, however, is merely a summary in verse, with a prose comment, of the Mimamsa Sutra. At the end of the sixteenth century Appayya Diksita wrote his Vidhirasayana,21 a disquisition on the nature of injunction, adding himself a commentary, the Sukhopayojini. This text was refuted by Gopala Bhatta in his Vidhirasayanabhusana, and by Sankara Bhatta in his Vidhirasayanadusana. The same author, who was of the same period as Appayya, wrote a commentary on the Sastradipika, and the Mimamsasarasamgraha,22 in which he enumerates 1,000 Adhikaranas, allotting to each a quarter verse. An extended version of this work forms his Mimamsabalaprakasa23 on which there is a commentary by Kesava, son of Visvanatha. Appayya himself wrote also the Upakramaparakrama, a treatise on the comparative importance of the commencement and end of a continuous Vedic passage.
The most popular introduction to the Mimamsa is probably the Mimamsanyayaprakasa24 of Apadeva, son of Anantadeva, and pupil of Govinda. His date is determined by the fact that his son, Anantadeva, wrote his Smritikaustubha under a prince who lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Anantadeva commented on his father's work in the Bhattalankara, and his brother, Jivadeva, discussed in the Bhattabhaskara the divergent views prevalent in the schools. Even better known, perhaps, is the Arthasamgraha25 of Laugaksi Bhaskara, which seems to be based in part on the work of Apadeva, and, if so, must belong to the seventeenth century. This date would suit adequately the probable period of his popular Nyaya-Vaisheshika treatise, the Tarkakaumudi. Another short text is the Mimamsaparibhasa26 of Krishna Diksita, and the Mimamsaratna of Raghunatha, who uses the Kasika, contains some information of value on the views of the opposing schools. Narayanatirtha Muni's Bhattabhasaprakasa27 is an exposition of the terminology of the Mimamsa, while Ramakrishna Udichya Bhattacharya's Adhikaranakaumudi28 expounds a selection of interesting Adhikaranas. Khandadeva's Bhattarahasya29 deals with the mode of determining which is the leading word in a text under discussion. More interesting is the fact that the famous Vallabha Acharya is credited with a Purvamimamsakarika, an epitome in 42 verses of Jaimini's views, written with reference to the doctrine of faith which Vallabha expounded, and a Jaiminisutrabhasya which deals with the first chapter of the second book of the Sutra. The well-known scholar, Venkatanatha Vedantacharya, in his Mimamsapaduka,30 inverse, discusses the Adhikaranas in the first chapter of the first book of the Sutra, and in his Sesvaramimamsa seeks to combine the Mimamsa with the Vedanta. Another writer from southern India, Venkatadhvarin, deals with the threefold classification of injunctions in his Vidhitrayaparitrana, while in his Mimamsamakaranda he discusses the authoritative character of Arthavadas. Narayana of Kerala, the well-known author of the Narayanya, who flourished at the end of the sixteenth century, gives in the first part of the Manameyodaya31 an account of Kumarila's views on the nature of proof; he purposed completing his task by adding an account of the same author's views on the world of reality, but this part of his work was never carried out, and was supplied at a later date by another Narayana, who was patronised by Manadeva, king of Sailabdhi; the work is interesting as showing how far the school of Kumarila went in appropriating the views of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy.
Of the other systems it is the Nyaya, and later the combined school of Nyaya-Vaisheshika, which throws the most light on the Mimamsa. The Nyaya Sutra deals critically with the Mimamsa doctrine of the eternity of the word, and Kumarila and Prabhakara32 alike appear to have developed their philosophical tenets under the influence of the controversy on logic which took place between the Nyaya school and the Buddhists, especially Dignaga and Dharmakirti on the other hand; Kumarila attacked both of these writers and was clearly aware of the Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara, in which the orthodox Nyaya view was set out in refutation of Dignaga's onslaughts. On the other hand, the Mimamsa views are freely disputed in Vachaspati Misra's comment on Uddyotakara and in Jayanta Bhatta's Nyayamanjari, Varadaraja's Tarkikaraksa, and Udayana's works, much of the Kusumanjali being expressly devoted to dealing with Mimamsa criticisms of the doctrine of the creation of the world. The Tattvachintamani of Gangesa repeatedly attacks the Mimamsa views of the nature and validity of proof, and the controversy is continued in the voluminous literature based on that important text, and in the short text-books of the combined school of Nyaya-Vaisheshika. In his commentary on Prasastapada's Bhasya Sridhara, from the point of view of the Vaisheshika deals freely with Mimamsa views; moreover, the Jain Haribhadra (ninth century) includes in his Saddarsanasamuccaya, commented on by Gunaratna, an account of the Mimamsa, and there are chapters upon it in the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha, falsely ascribed to Sankara, and in Madhava's Sarvadarsanasamgraha. The former work deals separately with the doctrines of Prabhakara and Kumarila; it betrays its late character by its attempt to show that Prabhakara was the pupil of Kumarila, and by converting the doctrine of Kumarila into a form of the Vedanta. The work of Madhava gives a long specimen of the conflicting views of the two schools as to the interpretation of the opening of the Sutra, and contains an interesting exposition of the arguments for and against the eternity of the Veda, and the self-evidence of cognition.
Jayanta Bhatta's work33 is of special interest, as it is the product of a member of a family skilled in the Mimamsa, and its author freely attacks Prabhakara and his followers, and repeatedly cites the Slokavarttika. The author's grandfather was confirmed in his faith in the efficacy of sacrifice by obtaining as the result of one offering the village of Gauramulaka, doubtless from a king of Kashmir, for Jayanta's great-grandfather, Saktisvamin, was a minister of Muktapida, better known as Lalitaditya. Incidentally Jayanta affords a welcome confirmation of the date of Vachaspati Misra, whom he quotes (pp. 120, 312), for, as Lalitaditya's reign ended about 753 A.D., it is impossible to place Jayanta later than the second half of the ninth century, and hence the disputed era of the year 898 given by Vachaspati himself as the date of his Nyayasuchi must be taken as falling in the Samvat reckoning as 841 A.D. This date, it may be added, tells strongly against any effort to bring down the date of Sankara,34 on whose Sarirakabhasya Vachaspati wrote the Bhamati, and the same conclusion is favoured by the view that Mandana Misra, on whose work Vachaspati also commented, was a pupil of Sankara.
Varadaraja also claims, with obvious truth, to have been an expert in Mimamsa;35 he was evidently familiar with Salikanatha's work, and his commentator fortunately preserves for us a fragment of the Prameyaparayana chapter of the Prakaranapanchika, no MS. of which has yet been discovered, which gives an authentic list of Prabhakara's categories.
God, the Soul, and Matter according to the Karma Mimamsa
THOUGH the Mimamsa is so deeply concerned with the sacrifice, it has no belief in the doctrine that the rewards of offering are to be expected either from the deities to whom the offerings are directed to be made, or from a God as creator or apportioner of reward and punishment. The sacrifice generates an unseen potency, whence the goods desired by sacrificers are obtained; the Vedanta Sutra (III, 2, 40) expressly negatives the idea that in Jaimini's view there was divine intervention in this regard, and the atheism of the true Mimamsa is regarded with such unanimity as to render it impossible to explain it away.36 The full development, however, of the doctrine is, as usual, to be found in Prabhakara and Kumarila, who adopted from the Nyaya-Vaisheshika the groundwork of their views of the world, but declined to follow that school in its speculations on the existence of a creator.37
The Nyaya-Vaisheshika, accepting the doctrine of atoms on the one hand and of the periodical creation and destruction of the world on the other, had found it necessary to introduce the conception of a creator, in order to secure in some measure a mode of bringing about the renewal and destruction of the combinations of the atoms and their connection with souls. But Prabhakara and Kumarila alike deny absolutely the validity of the belief in the periodic creation and dissolution of all things; they accept a constant process of becoming and passing away, but they find no ground for the systematisation of the process, so as to produce cycles of evolution and involution of souls. Experience, Prabhakara urges, shows us the bodies of all animals being produced by purely natural means; we can argue hence to the facts of the past and the future, and need invoke no extraneous aid. Moreover, the whole conception of God supervising the merits and demerits of men is idle; God cannot perceive merit or demerit by perception, since they are not perceptible, nor by the mind, which is confined to the body which it occupies. Supervision also is impossible, even had God the necessary knowledge; it must take the form either of contact, which is impossible as merit and demerit being qualities are not subject to contact, or inherence, and plainly a man's qualities cannot inhere in God. If the argument is adduced of the analogy of the carpenter, it may be replied that on this basis the creator would have to be an embodied spirit, and no embodied spirit can affect such subtle things as the atoms or merit and demerit. Nor is it conceivable that the atoms should themselves act under the will of God, for no parallel to such activity is known to us, and, if it were possible, it would follow from the eternity of the will of God that creation would be unceasing. The only true case of supervision known to us is that exercised by the soul over the body, which it occupies by virtue of its merit or demerit, and there is no need to hold that the world is more than an ever-changing sequence of things affected by the souls in it.
Kumarila's treatment includes both an elaborate attack on the whole conception of creation and a special refutation of the Vaisheshika views. He ridicules the idea of the existence of Prajapati before the creation of matter; without a body, how could he feel desire? If he possessed a body, then matter must have existed before his creative activity, and there is no reason to deny then the existence of other bodies. Nor is there any intelligible motive for creation; granted that, when the world exists, conditions are regulated by merit and demerit, originally there was no merit or demerit, and the creation of a world full of misery was inexcusable, for it is idle to argue that a creator could only produce a world in which there is sin and pain. Yet, if his action is conditioned, he cannot be omnipotent. If, again, it is alleged that the creation was for his amusement, this contradicts the theory that he is perfectly happy, and would involve him in much wearisome toil. Moreover, there is no possibility of establishing the reality of his creative activity. It could only rest on reports of the first of created men, and they could have no power to testify effectively to a state of things existing before they were brought into being. They could only rely on what they were told by the creator, and his assertions might be mere boasting. Nor is it at all satisfactory to accept the belief in the creation of the Veda, which by no means enhances its value; still less to hold that it resides with the creator during the periodic dissolutions of the world, for which, again, there is not a shred of evidence.
Against the Vaisheshika view of creation exception is justly taken to the difficulty involved in holding that in some manner the action of the Supreme Lord brings to a stand at one time the potencies of all the souls, and then awakens them all when a new creation is imminent. Against this view it is contended that the activity of men arising from their past deeds can never cease, and it is absurd needlessly to complicate matters by assuming both the force of men's deeds and the intervention of the desire of God. Moreover, it is impossible to explain why this desire should ever arise, and unintelligible to elucidate the mode in which the creator can act without a body or acquire a body.
Kumarila, however, does not content himself with refuting the Nyaya-Vaisheshika doctrine; he attacks equally the Vedanta,38 on the simple ground that, if the absolute is, as it is asserted to be, absolutely pure, the world itself should be absolutely pure. Moreover, there could be no creation, for nescience is impossible in such an absolute. If, however, we assume that some other cause starts nescience to activity, then the unity of the absolute disappears. Again, if nescience is natural it is impossible to remove it, for that could be accomplished only by knowledge of the self, which, on the theory of the natural character of nescience, is out of the question. Nor is the Sankhya doctrine of many selves and nature any more tenable as a theory of creation. The beginning of creation is held to be due to a disturbance in the equilibrium of the three constituents which make up nature. But how can such a disturbance take place at a first creation, when there are no potencies due to men's actions demanding fruition? Even at subsequent creations, how do latent potentialities by themselves become fruitful without any consciousness to direct them? And, if they do attain fruition, the Sankhya theory of liberation by knowledge is without value, since the potencies will remain able to come again into activity. Knowledge, it must be recognised, can never give freedom from bondage, which can be attained only by the exhaustion of action, for which the Sankhya metaphysics affords no adequate possibility, owing to the infinite potentiality of nature.
Though the existence of a creator is denied, the Mimamsa accepts without reserve the doctrine of the existence of the self or soul,39 and Sabarasvamin elaborates the case for its existence; Prabhakara and Kumarila both develop the theme in close accordance with his views. The necessity of the existence of the self for the Mimamsa rests on its fundamental assumption that the sacrifices are performed to secure, in many cases, a reward not in this life. There must, therefore, be an eternal entity, distinct from the body, the sense organs, and cognitions, which is both the doer of actions and the reaper of their reward. It is not unnaturally objected that there is a strong presumption against claiming eternity for something which suffers change, but the more serious objection is made that men do not realise, when they reap results, the actions which brought these about, thus invalidating the value of the assumed continuity, and that there is nothing unnatural in a man determining to do an act which will lead to evil results in the future, secure in the knowledge that, when these results come to fruition, he will not remember their cause. To this Kumarila replies that remembrance has nothing whatever to do with the matter; the wise, who alone are worthy of sacrificing, realise in all their actions the law of retribution, even without remembering the facts of each case. Nor is it any argument against the eternity of the soul that it undergoes modifications; we see in actual experience abundant evidence of changes in man's condition in life without any cessation of the substantial identity, and we treat death as no more than a change through which the soul endures. The sea remains, despite the movements of its waves; the serpent uncoils, without change of essence.
To the theory of the substantial soul the Buddhist at once objects, and proposes instead the doctrine of the series of ideas, each of which gathers from its predecessor the impressions of its unending past. The performer, therefore, it is contended, is the same as the enjoyer, but this contention Kumarila rejects. It is impossible to accept this view, he argues, unless the first idea and the last in the series, from performance to result, have a common substratum. Apart from the fact that, if ideas are really momentary, there can be no interaction and no series, it is impossible on the series theory to find any rational basis for action, since the doer will clearly not reap what he did, and action without rational ground is out of the question among men. Moreover, the exact character of transmigration presents insuperable difficulties on the Buddhist theory. It is impossible for an immaterial idea to move about in a living body, much less to transfer itself from one body to another. The hypothesis of a subtle body which serves as an intermediary between one life and rebirth is denied by Vindhyavasin, and unsupported by any evidence, nor, if it existed, is it clear how an idea would pass with it. Nor, again, can the existence of an idea in the embryo be explained. The embryo has no sense organs and cannot have cognitions, and an idea is never known to exist save in the form of a cognition. Nor can it be supposed that the idea exists as a latent potentiality in the embryo without a substratum, while, if the sense organs are assumed to be the substratum, then they would possess intelligence, and rebirth would become impossible, since on their destruction intelligence would go also; further, the share played by the organs in developing the idea would contradict the Buddhist doctrine that the idea arises from a preceding idea only. Nor is there any evidence that the first cognition of the newborn child is due to a previous idea; we hold that it arises from the functioning of the sense organs. There must, therefore, be something which possesses the potentiality of ideas, is eternal, and capable of transmigration. This need is furnished by the soul, which is immaterial and omnipresent, and thus, without motion, is able to connect itself with one body after another.
The soul, then, is essentially active, for, unlike the Vaisheshika school, the Mimamsa does not, according to Kumarila, deem that motion is the only form of action, and it is through its superintending activity that the motions of the body are achieved. We must, therefore, conceive the soul engaged from time immemorial in the work of directing a body, the acts done in each life determining the character of the body attained in the next, a process which will cease only, if ever, when the soul ceases to obtain a bodily habitation.
Again, from another point of view the Buddhist conception of a series is imperfect. Granted that it is impossible to establish a soul merely on the ground of such attributes of the soul as pleasure, desire, or memory, adduced by the Vaisheshika school as indications of the existence of the soul, since these might be explained on the theory of impressions, no such explanation is available to dispose of the cognition of the self. In the case of the two judgments, “I knew” and " I know," the theory of ideas breaks completely down. The first idea cannot, as past, know the later idea, nor can the later idea know the first. It is useless to appeal to a series, for the series was not present at the first cognition, nor is it present at the last. Nor is there any unity in the two cognitions, for the Buddhist refuses to recognise any classes. Nor can it be argued that similarity would suffice, for in cognitions of different objects, e.g. a horse and a cow, there is no similarity of cognition. The bare fact of each being in one aspect a cogniser would at most give merely the bare recognition that there was a cogniser, but no personal identity. A true permanent substance is, therefore, essential, and such a substance explains far more effectively than any other hypothesis such phenomena as desire, memory, and pleasure and pain, while it is the indispensable basis of merit and demerit.
This permanent entity is quite distinct from the body, the senses, or cognition. The elements of the body are seen to be without intelligence, and the combination of such elements cannot produce intelligence. If, again, one element alone had this nature, the others could not coalesce with it to form a body. A dead body, which consists of precisely the same material as the living body, contains no intelligence. On the contrary, the fact that a body is an organised whole suggests irresistibly the fact that it serves the purpose of another which directs it, namely, the soul. Such phrases as “I am fat," or” I go,“are merely natural transfers of use. On the other hand, the phrase” My body “shows clearly that the ego and the body are different. The same argument can be applied to the case of the sense organs, but others are also available; thus the fact that I feel with my hand what I see with my eyes shows that there is something beyond the sense organs. Again, a blind man remembers what he saw when his eyesight remained, which would be impossible if the organ were the self. More generally the analysis of any cognition reveals to us the fact that the” I “is not the body, nor the sense organs nor the cognition itself, but something over and beyond. Many people can have the same cognition as far as content is concerned, but each cognition has an individual reference, as is seen also with perfect clearness in the facts of memory; if there were no” I ", how could we have the fact that one, who has learned half a lesson at one time, can later on resume the task at the place at which he left off? The objection, that the terms “My soul” indicate a difference between the “I” and the soul, is met by holding that in the word "soul“the meaning”cognition" is to be understood, cognition often being inaccurately described as the soul. The result can be confirmed by the evidence of the Samhitas and Brahmanas, the former of which implicitly, the latter explicitly, recognise the existence of the eternal soul.
There must, however, be something to mediate between the eternal and omnipresent soul and the world, else its knowledge would be eternal and omniscient, as emphatically it is not. The mediator is furnished by mind, whose contact with the soul is the essential condition for its consciousness in all its forms. For this contact it is necessary that mind should, in contrast to soul which is omnipresent, be atomic, and possess the capacity of extremely rapid motion, a fact which makes our experiences, even when truly successive as they are, appear on occasion to be simultaneous. Mind, however, can exist only in a body, which the soul must ensoul, and then through it the soul comes into contact with the outer world by means of the sense organs. Through the contact of external objects with the sense organs, mediated by the mind, the soul appreciates the outer world; the mind directly conveys to it knowledge of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, which are among its qualities. It possesses further qualities: cognition, which is self cognised in the terminology of Prabhakara or, as Kumarila has it, inferred; merit and demerit, which are inferred; and impression (samskara), which is produced by apprehension and results in memory, from whose operations it is inferred. The principle of impression, moreover, really applies to merit and demerit, for these exist in the form of impressions of past activities, and can hardly be said to be separate qualities, since they merely sum up in terms of moral value the nature of the accumulated impressions; hence, though they appear as distinct elements in the Nyaya-Vaisheshika lists, one list of qualities attributed to Kumarila more logically leaves out merit and demerit. Further, the soul possesses the common qualities of number, namely, unity; individuality; dimension as omnipresent as opposed to atomic, or of the same size as the body as held by the Jains; and conjunction and disjunction with mind. Nothing is more obscure than this relation between the soul and the mind. It is said to be brought about by merit and demerit, but it is obvious that it is also affected by the activity of the soul, which is never regarded as merely passive in its attitude to mind. The impossibility of expressing the relationship intelligibly is inherent in the effort to bridge the gulf between the material and the immaterial worlds. But it is curious that, as in the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, there is no real attempt in the Mimamsa to explain in what way mind is active in the processes of reasoning. It is obvious that inference, and the other means of proof apart from sense perception, must be due to the activity of mind in contact with the soul, but insistence on the part of mind in the direct perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort has apparently resulted in obscuring the essential part which it must be deemed to play in the higher mental activities, if for no other reason than that they all rest, save verbal cognition and negation, on sense perception as an ultimate basis, and even verbal cognition and negation must be mediated to the soul by mind.
The soul, then, with the aid of the mind, is the enjoyer of all experience; the sense organs the instruments; the objects, external or internal, the world and the qualities of the soul; and the body is the abode of the sense organs and the mind, through whose instrumentality the soul has experience. Of bodies Prabhakara recognises three kinds only — womb-born, egg-born and sweat-born — omitting, with some Nyaya-Vaisheshika authorities, the vegetable body, on the ground that its possession of sense organs is not established, despite the Jain views on this topic. None but earth bodies are accepted by Prabhakara, though the Nyaya-Vaisheshika accepts the existence in other worlds of water bodies, fire bodies and air bodies; this excludes the Vedanta view, which finds in the body five or three elements or the variant which admits of four only. The body, however, in any event is essentially subservient to the soul, which acquires a body in accordance with its past deeds; in what manner this is accomplished neither Prabhakara or Kumarila tell us, for in truth the problem is incomprehensible.
So far the views of Prabhakara and Kumarila seem to be in general harmony, but there is a distinct discrepancy, if not a very important one, in their view of the manner in which the soul is cognised. In the view of Prabhakara the cognition is self-illumined, but this doctrine is not applicable to the soul. The Vedanta view, of course, insists on the doctrine of self-illumination in the case of the cognition and the soul as consciousness alike; Prabhakara objects that in this case the soul must be present in consciousness during the state of deep sleep no less than during the waking, dreaming and fourth states, and, as all our consciousness can be explained by hypothesis of the self-illumination of cognition, it is needless to assume any other self-luminous object. The Nyaya view, which makes the soul to be the object of direct perception, as opposed to the Vaisheshika doctrine of the inferring of the soul, which is also found in older Nyaya, is rejected by Prabhakara on the ground that it serves to make the perceived also the perceiver, which is in his view absurd, a position for which there is clearly much better ground than in the cognate case of the denial of the mental perception of cognition. The theory which he adopts is, then, simply that in every cognition the soul enters into the cognition as a necessary element, and, therefore, in a sense the soul is cognised by the same means of valid cognition as the objects which it knows. But, while the soul is thus cognised, it is not cognised as a true object; it is cognised as the agent in cognition, just as a man who walks is the agent of walking, not the object. The soul, therefore, is the substratum of the self-illumined cognition, into which it enters in the element of " I," and this fact explains why in deep sleep there is no self-consciousness, since at that time there is no cognition, and the soul can be known only along with a cognition. But the fact that there is no cognition does not mean that there is no soul: consciousness is not, as in the Vedanta, the essence of the soul, but a mere quality of it, and in the state of liberation the soul remains eternally existent, though by ceasing to have cognitions it ceases to be cognised. While this view of the knowledge of the soul in self-consciousness is ingenious and not unhappy, laying as it does due stress on the necessary implication of the self in consciousness, it is a little difficult to see why Prabhakara did not admit that the soul was self-illumined, which is certainly the natural interpretation of the Sabarabhasya (p. 22). That term seems to apply more readily to the soul than to cognitions on his own theory, in which the cognition seems really to be inferred, as it actually is held to be by the school of Kumarila.
How far Kumarila really differs from Prabhakara in these views is not clear. He certainly is credited by such texts as the Sastradipika (p. 101) and the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha (VIII, 37) with the view that the self is the object of direct perception by the mind, a view ascribed by the Nyayamanjari (p. 429) to the Aupavarsas,40 and this is perhaps a legitimate deduction from the doctrine, which he certainly held, that the existence of the self is established through the notion of “I." The soul he holds to be the substratum of the” I “element in cognition, and this appears to be practically identical with Prabhakara's view that the soul is the substratum of the self-illumined cognition, and the” I " element in it. Kumarila, however, adopts in the Tantravarttika41 the doctrine that the soul is pure consciousness, though he distinguishes it from cognition, but this characteristic is hardly more than a verbal deviation from the view of Prabhakara, as far as practical results go.
Prabhakara and Kumarila are agreed as to the fact of there existing a multitude of separate souls, as is the necessary supposition of the Sutra and the theme of the Bhasya. The perception of another soul is obviously impossible, but one sees the activities of other bodies, and infers thence that they must be ensouled, just as one's own body is ensouled. Thus, if a pupil has learned half his task in one day, the fact that he continues to learn the next half the next day is a good ground for assuming that he possesses a soul. The same result can be arrived at from the fact that merit and demerit are infinitely various, and not one, as they must be if there were one soul only. The objection that pain is felt as localised, though there is but one soul in the body, is met by insisting that in reality the feeling is in the soul, and it is only the cause of the pain which can be said to be localised. The further Vedanta contention, that the sun, though one, appears by reflection in different substances to be endowed with diverse qualities, is also rebutted by the observation that the qualities, which appear different, do not really belong to the sun but to the reflecting medium. On this analogy the different qualities appearing in connection with the soul would belong to the bodies which are ensouled, and this conclusion is manifestly contrary to fact, since cognition, etc., are qualities, as we have seen, of soul, not of body. It is characteristic, however, of the tendency to import Vedanta conceptions into the Mimamsa that the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha (VIII, 39) asserts categorically that there is one real supreme self, of which the individual selves are unreal differentiations.
Such being the nature of the soul of man, his normal lot is to continue in an unending cycle of lives, each determined from the outset by his actions in previous lives, unless he adopts the path which leads to freedom from this round of existence. The process of this liberation is sketched by Prabhakara; first the man becomes disgusted by the troubles which attend this mortal life; then he realises that even the pleasures of this life are inseparable from pain, both in their attainment and in their disappearance; accordingly he devotes his mind to seeking final release from all worldly things. To this end he abstains from all prohibited acts, which lead to punishment hereafter, and also from all acts which are undertaken for the purpose of attaining some worldly or heavenly guerdon. He also exhausts the accumulated store of his merit and demerit by undergoing the experiences which result thence. Finally he destroys the receptacle of experience by the knowledge of the soul, together with such concomitants as contentment, self-restraint and so forth, all things enjoined by the scriptures to prevent the return of the soul. When all this is accomplished, then the achievement of release is brought about. Prabhakara insists that, as the texts enjoin the knowledge of the soul for no ulterior purpose, it must be understood that the absence of rebirth is the reward of this knowledge. Liberation thus consists in the cessation of the operation of merit or demerit, and in total freedom from the body. Liberation is purely negative in character; the soul exists as a mere existence without cognition, and without either pleasure or pain, both of which are essentially connected with the presence of the soul in the body. The existence thus achieved is thus like that attained in the view of the Vaisheshika, the condition enjoyed by a stone as the author of the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha maliciously points out.
Kumarila's views are largely in harmony with those of Prabhakara; thus he holds that liberation cannot be supposed to be bliss in any form, which is essentially transient and unreal. But, consistently with the main aim of the Mimamsa, he cannot admit that the Vedic texts, which seem to connect freedom from return with knowledge of the soul, mean that knowledge produces directly this result. This would conflict with the criticisms urged by him against the Sankhya that they erroneously hold that knowledge by itself can terminate bondage; it is, on the contrary, only possible to counteract the accumulated result of past deeds by working off the consequences; the function of knowledge, therefore, may prevent further accumulation of merit and demerit; it cannot annul what has been accumulated. So Kumarila attaches only an indirect value to knowledge of the self as a factor in sacrificial performance; in the first place, it serves to induce men to undertake sacrifices in cases where they would not else be willing to do so, for they understand the distinction of soul and body and the spiritual advantages of sacrificing. In the second place, through such knowledge men learn to perform the regular offerings, including not merely the fixed offerings but those for special occasions and penances, with the aim merely of avoiding the sin which arises from non-performance, and without any desire for the advantages accruing therefrom. It is agreed that men who do not desire the results of such sacrifices do not obtain them, a doctrine which, of course, is familiar in another application from the Bhagavadgita. Thus, then, by this means the actions of past lives are worked out, while no new action is accumulated, and the man becomes ready for final release in the shape of perpetual freedom from corporeal attachment. The final condition, then, of man will be the persistence of pure consciousness, but without cognition or feeling of any sort. This view, though in entire harmony with the Mimamsa, has suffered the usual fate at the hands of the later texts,42 in which it is asserted that the final condition of man is a state of constant bliss.
In what manner then does the performance of sacrifice operate as affecting the soul? The Mimamsa in both schools is confident that there is no question of rewards coming from the deity to whom the offerings are made; no deity is either eternal or omnipresent, and there could be no assurance of it ever receiving the numerous offerings made by diverse votaries, apart from the difficulty of the deity conferring rewards. There must, therefore, be a capacity, which does not exist prior to the sacrificial action, either in the principal performance or in the agent, but which is generated in the course of the performance. Before a man performs a sacrifice, which will lead to heaven, there is an incapacity in the offering and in the man himself to secure that result, but, when he has performed it, he becomes, as a result of the action, endowed with a potency, styled Apurva, which in the course of time will secure for him the end desired. The existence of this potency is testified to in the scriptures; its necessity is apparent by the means of proof known as presumption. We find in the Veda assertions that sacrifices produce certain results, and, as the operation of the sacrifice, as we see it, is transient, the truth of the scripture would be vitiated if we did not accept the theory of Apurva. Nor is there anything illogical in the doctrine; every action sets in force activities in substances or agents, and these come to fruition when the necessary auxiliaries are present. The action specified is called into existence by the injunction contained in the form of an optative in a sentence in the Veda.
From this doctrine Prabhakara dissents, elaborating instead a theory which is obviously a refinement on the simple view which Kumarila accepts from the older writers of the school and which best suits the Mimamsa Sutra.43 In his opinion the injunction rests in the sentence as a whole, not in the optative verb, and he denies that from the action there arises directly the Apurva. On the contrary, the process is that the injunctive sentence lays down a mandate, Niyoga; this excites the man to exertion, and this exertion pertains to some form of action, indicated by the verb of the injunctive sentence. The exertion produces in the agent a result (karya) to which also the name of Niyoga is given by Prabhakara, on the ground that it is this which acts as an incentive to the agent to put forth exertion towards the performance of the action denoted by the verb of the injunctive clause. The Niyoga, however, is unable to produce its result, unless aided by something which Salikanatha styles fate, nor is it apparent that either in his terminology or in his view of the process Prabhakara's doctrine is any superior to that of Kumarila. It seems as if primarily it arose from nothing more important than the observation that the result produced in the agent was in one sense his motive to action as much as the sentence directing the action to be done, leading to a transfer of the term Niyoga, naturally applicable to the sentence, to the condition in the agent to which the more orthodox name of Apurva was usually applied.
In simple sacrifices there is only one Apurva produced, but in more complicated sacrifices there may be several, as a rule four. Thus in the new and full moon sacrifices, consisting of two sets of three oblations at new and full moon respectively, there may be distinguished the Angapurva, pertaining to the minor acts of the several oblations; the Utpattyapurva, the result flowing from each of the three oblations in either set; the Samudayapurva, the result of each group of three; and the Phalapurva, the result of the whole performance regarded as a unit. But it is not every action which brings about an Apurva; those actions, which are devoted simply to some material result, though a part of the sacrifice, such as the appointment of priests or the threshing of corn, are not credited with any such effect, as they serve an immediate purpose and need no further explanation.
In the view of both schools there is a clear relation between the injunction and the action of the agent; the former possesses a verbal energy (sabdi bhavana in its tendency to produce action by the agent, while the latter puts forth actual energy (arthi bhavana towards the end indicated in the injunction.44
It is significant of the theistic tendency of Indian thought that even the Mimamsa was not exempt from transformation. Despite its emphatic denial of the existence of a Supreme Lord, the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha (VIII, 40, 41) treats the end of man as to be obtained by meditation upon, and worship of, the Supreme Spirit which is manifested in each man, and authors, such as Apadeva and Laugaksi Bhaskara, declare that if the sacrifice is performed in honour of Govinda or the creator, Isvara, it leads to the highest good, basing this assertion on the authority of the Bhagavadgita. Hence it is easy to explain the tendency of such works as the Sesvaramimamsa of the polymath Venkatesa, where Vedanta tenets are grafted on the Mimamsa. Gunaratna, in his comment on the Saddarsanasamuccaya (p. 298) similarly attributes to Jaimini acceptance of the Maya doctrine.
The question, however, arises, how far, in accepting views of the future of the spirit, which are rejected by both Prabhakara and by Kumarila, and in imparting a theistic tinge to the doctrine, later texts relied on earlier authority, now lost to us. It must be remembered that in the Vedanta Sutra there are attributed to Jaimini not merely views in entire harmony with his principles, such as insistence (IV, 1, 17) on the fact that works bear their due fruit without any divine intervention of any kind, but also opinions which show him in the unexpected light of a true Vedantin, though not of the orthodox doctrine of Sankara. Thus he is credited with the view that the order in which a man must pass through the various stages of life (asramas) is fixed as from lower to higher, and never vice versa, and as explaining away as metaphorical the assertion that the highest spirit is a span in size. More precise light is thrown on his doctrine by the fact that he adopted the view of the fate of the soul on departing, by which it is ultimately led by a spirit to Brahman, in the sense that the absolute Brahman is meant, though Sankara argued, apparently against the intention of the Vedanta Sutra (IV, 3, 7-14) that the reference is to the lower Brahman, the soul passing to the higher state only on the occurrence of the absorption of the lower Brahman. In its final condition the soul possesses, according to Jaimini, all the qualities of the Brahman enumerated in the Chandogya Upanishad (VIII, 7), together with omnipotence and omniscience, and further possesses a body and senses, having the power of assuming many diverse forms. Though this is not the view of Sankara (IV, 4, 5, 11) it can hardly be imagined that Jaimini really regarded this condition as pertaining to the soul merely preparatory to final absorption in the Brahman; we may rather suppose that on this topic his views were akin to those of Ramanuja, and perhaps of Badarayana himself.
If we were to hold that the Jaimini of the Karma-Mimamsa and the Jaimini of the Vedanta must be regarded as enunciating one body of doctrine, we would be forced to the admission that the later school of Mimamsa departed from the principles of the founder of the doctrine by ignoring the fact that the Mimamsa Sutra represented only one side of his thought. But to accept this would probably be to lay far too much stress on the traditional allocation of doctrines; it is far more plausible to assume that the views expressed in the Mimamsa do not represent one aspect of the thought of an individual sage, but are the expression of the doctrine of a school, which appealed to Jaimini and Badarayana only so far as it thought fit to adopt or discuss views of theirs. It would otherwise be altogether too remarkable that of two authorities, who covered much the same ground, we should have preserved the Sutra of one on the doctrine of action, and the Sutra of the other on the nature of the absolute, and in both cases the form of the Sutra is decidedly unfavourable to the view that it is the production of one definite author. The shadowy personalities of Jaimini and Badarayana can hardly claim much more effective reality than those of Gautama or Kanada, or even than Kapila himself.
If, on the one hand, there was a tendency to adapt the Mimamsa to theistic or pantheistic views, there was on the other a steady process of degradation of the deities to whom the offerings were supposed to be made. It can hardly be assumed that these deities were not believed to be real by the founders of the Mimamsa. And there is nothing to show that Jaimini did not accept their existence. But the later doctrine, as evinced in such works as the Devatasvarupavichara of Apadeva, does not accept the validity of the descriptions of the deities given in the Puranas as showing the existence of such beings; these passages rank as mere Arthavada; the deity is merely that to which offering is made, and has no existence beyond the Mantras addressed to it.
Notes
- Deussen, Vedanta, ch. I.
- Thibaut, S.B.E., XXXIV, ix ff.
- Jacobi, J.A.O.S., XXXI, 1 ff.; Keith, J.R.A.S., 1914, pp. 1091 ff.; see below, pp. 46, 47.
- Ganganatha Jha, trans. of Slokavarttika, p. 116.
- In II, 3, 16, he clearly describes the Vrittikara as bhagavan acaryah; cf. III, 1, 6. These passages Jacobi has overlooked.
- Parthasarathi on Slokavarttika, p. 4 (v. 10); he is cited on the organ of sound, Nyayamanjari, p. 213.
- Sastradipika, X, 2, 59, 60.
- See Ganganatha Jha, The Prabhakara School of Purva Mimamsa (1911).
- Ed. Benares, 1903-04; the text is defective, and the Prameyaparayana is lacking. He uses Uddyotakara (e.g. p. 44) and Dharmakirti, and therefore is not before 650-700 A.D., but is probably before Kumarila. Prabhakara thus dates about 600-650 A.D.
- Ed. Benares, 1898-99; trans. Ganganatha Jha, Bibliotheca Indica, 1900-8.
- Ed. Benares, 1890; trans. Ganganatha Jha, Bibliotheca Indica, 1903-20.
- Pathak, J.B.R.A.S. XVIII, 213 ff.
- Ibid. p. 228.
- Ed. Pandit, XXV-XXVIII, 1903-6.
- Ed. Benares, 1892.
- Ed. Benares, 1891. He is earlier than Madhava.
- Ed. Benares, 1900.
- Ed. Conjeveram, 1902 (I, 2 only). The Dipika is ed. in the Bibliotheca Indica.
- Ed. Pandit, XVII-XXI.
- Ed. London, 1878.
- Ed. Benares, 1901.
- Ed. Benares, 1904.
- Ed. Benares, 1902.
- Ed. Calcutta, 1901; Benares, 1905.
- Ed. and trans. Thibaut, Benares, 1882.
- Ed. Benares, 1904.
- Ed. Benares, 1900.
- Ed. Calcutta, 1885.
- Ed. Conjeveram, 1900.
- Ed. Conjeveram, 1900.
- Ed. Trivandrum, 1912.
- Prakaranapanchika, pp. 47, 64, discusses Dharmakirti's views of perception and inference.
- Ed. Benares, 1895. His quotation from Vachaspati on Sutra II, 1, 32, is found at p. 312. His son, Abhinanda, wrote the Kadambarikathasara and lived c. 900 A.D.; Thomas, Kavindravacanasamuccaya, p. 30.
- S. V. Venkateswara (J.R.A.S., 1916, pp. 151-62) ignores this evidence in giving Sankara's date as 805-897 A.D. He cannot have died later than 825 A.D. or so.
- Ed. Benares, 1903, p. 364.
- As does Max Muller, Six Systems, pp. 275-79; cf. K. L. Sarkar, Tagore Law Lectures, 1905, p. 508.
- Prakaranapanchika, pp. 137-40; Slokavarttika, pp. 639-80; Manameyodaya, pp. 70-74; cf. Nyayamanjari, pp. 193-204; Saddarsanasamuccaya, pp. 284 ff.
- Cf. Nyayamanjari, pp. 525-31.
- Mimamsa Sutra, pp. 18-24; Prakaranapanchika, pp. 141-60; Slokavarttika, pp. 689-728; Manameyodaya, pp. 78-84.
- Cf. Manameyodaya, p. 80. But in Slokavarttika, p. 525 (vv. 142, 143), he seems to accept self-illumination from the Bhasya.
- Trans., p. 516; so Slokavarttika, p. 187 (v. 167).
- Manameyodaya, p. 88.
- II, 1, 1 ff.; Prakaranapanchika, pp. 185 ff.; Tantravarttika, II, 1, 1-3.
- Mimamsanyayaprakasa (ed. Benares) pp. 1-22, 118-35; Mimamsaparibhasa, pp. 25-30.
Source
A. Berriedale Keith, The Karma-Mimamsa. Heritage of India Series. Calcutta: Association Press (Y.M.C.A.); London: Oxford University Press, 1921. Pages used: 6–16 (chapter I, beginning at “and, unless this is established”) and 61–78 (chapter IV, complete). Spellings of Sanskrit names have been standardised and the diacritical marks removed. This article is from public domain digital sources.
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